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Abstract: This paper discusses possible ways to overcome the situation of physical 
isolation and the multiple failures that pervade Andean villages. Specifically, it studies 
a training program developed by a Peruvian NGO, which aims at triggering the 
development of a market for agricultural services that reach the rural poor. First-hand 
data is used to identify the scope of the market so-created. It is then looked at 
determinants of successful intervention, through different indicators. The empirical 
tests developed show that training farmers as on-the-field consultants is a relevant 
strategy in the adverse environment under study, provided that the practical 
implementation is well designed and that some particular constraints are properly 
taken into account. In particular, training specialists on one relevant topic is much 
more effective than training generalists. Hence, our results should be viewed as one 
building block in the debate over the design of successful innovative schemes for 
agrarian extension in the context of isolation traps and cultural constraints.  
Keywords: poverty reduction, agrarian extension, community-based consultants, 
market failures. 
JEL codes: Q16, 033. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Technological innovation has become crucial to ensuring the development of a 
competitive agriculture in today’s global economy, and to deliver food to the growing world 
population given land and water scarcities. In Peru, it is also vital for the subsistence of a 
large share of the national population: “in terms of employment sectors, Peru keeps being an 
agricultural country, as agriculture accounts for at least one third of the total economically 
active population (i.e. 4 million workers), the majority of which has a low education and 
works on small-scale remote family farms” [UNDP, 2005: 95; own translation]. Promoting 
sustainable economic growth in rural areas and increasing rural incomes are among the most 
crucial issues to fight the persistent poverty in Peru [World Bank, 2002 and 2006].  
In Peru as in most countries of Latin America, governments have developed Agrarian 
Extension (AE) activities since the middle of the 20th century, in order to help isolated areas 
overcoming the huge transaction costs that usually pervade them. Following Coello et al. 
(2004), we define the concept of AE as “every process that helps technology adoption by 
farmers, in order to enhance their production and profitability”. It thus comprises the notion of 
technical assistance (TA), i.e. advisory and specific technical help to farmers, which is the 
central topic of the present work.  
In the traditional model, government or NGO extension agencies provide services 
directly to farmers. Yet, “many observers document poor performance in the operation of 
extension and informal education systems, due to bureaucratic inefficiency, deficient program 
design, “top-down” transmission of knowledge, and some generic weaknesses inherent in 
publicly operated, staff-intensive, information delivery systems” [Feder et al., 2001: 45]. In 
the 90s, wide market liberalization and increased fiscal discipline led to the dismantling of 
most public systems of services to the small agriculture, leaving those to the private sector. 
Unfortunately, in most cases, the latter did not take over successfully, which contributed to a 
generalized increase in rural poverty [Chapman and Tripp, 2003; de la Torre, 2004a].  
Therefore, today, developing and strengthening effective markets for goods and 
services relevant to farmers and rural microentrepreneurs hold significant power to improve 
the living standards of many poor worldwide. Arguably, private markets can potentially 
deliver much wider, fairer and more sustainable benefits to poor populations than any other 
targeted, short-term and small-scale intervention of development agencies. Yet, these 
expected benefits need strong conditions to actually occur. It is crucial to work on structures 
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and characteristics of existing markets in order to increase participation by the poor on terms 
that benefit them [Miehlbradt and Mc Vay, 2005; Kimenyi, 2007]. Important reforms of the 
business-enabling environment are usually needed, such as securing property rights, 
mitigating transaction costs, adapting the regulatory environment etc. In addition, in very 
isolated areas, one needs to actively stimulate local markets. Two basic ways are conceivable 
to do this: adding suppliers or adding purchasing power to the market.  
This paper examines how a Peruvian NGO took the first path to overcome lack of 
innovation in one of the poorest areas of Peru. It relies on a participatory approach with 
community institutions to encourage the development of a market for AE services that reach 
the rural poor. In effect, the intervention amounts to expanding the existing supply by training 
alternative, local consultants. The hypothesis is that rural poor can pay for relevant services 
provided an adequate supply is available. Interestingly, another development project was 
found in the same area, which adopts the demand-driven strategy. That is, this second agency 
relies on subsidies in order to create (or empower) a rural demand and allow people to start 
micro-businesses. We discuss it briefly afterwards. 
Based on first-hand data, this paper provides various insights about the relevance of 
the NGO’s supply-driven strategy. Our data (particularly the lack of exogenous control 
groups) do not allow us to actually quantify impacts. However, we measure the peasants’ 
ability (or willingness) to pay, which is at the core of the divergence between the two 
strategies mentioned. Using a multivariate probit model, we identify some key variables that 
statistically influence the success probability of the project under study. Especially, we take 
advantage of an exogenous change in the design of the NGO program to show that training 
specialists on one single topic (rather than generalists) is much more likely to deliver 
successful suppliers. In fine, we argue that, in the context under study (but probably also 
elsewhere), training farmers to become suppliers of TA is an effective and sustainable 
approach to promote long-term development. Once community-based consultants are in place, 
a marketable demand for their services emerges, even among very poor areas2.  
The success that we evidence is encouraging, as other development programs based on 
the training of on-the-field promoters generally imply very little diffusion of knowledge to 
non participants [Feder et al., 2003; Rola, Jamias and Quizon, 2002]. Yet, we are not the first 
                                                 
2 By contrast, relying on existing private markets may prove to be elusive, since the poor often face 
strong physical, economic and cultural constraints, which come back to the fore as soon as subsidies stop (in a 
previous report, Demont 2006 gives empirical indications about the relative failure of the demand-driven 
strategy). 
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to assess the empirical relevance of the program under study. Figueroa and Portugal (1998), 
Coello et al. (2004), La Cruz et al. (2004) and Ita (2005) all reported positive impacts of the 
training of farmer consultants. However, for the first time, the anecdotal evidence gathered by 
the NGO’s staff is being confirmed through a rigorous quantitative analysis. We pinpoint - 
and interpret - the field observations that statistically matter by using a set of reliable 
indicators. We think this work might be relevant for many development projects based on the 
training of local leaders. For instance, the training’s contents, the prevailing community 
constraints and the incentives that are being given to participants should be carefully studied.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the target area and 
emphasizes the poor economic context resulting from its physical isolation. Section 2 explains 
how the two organizations that we study overcome this situation, as well as their working 
hypothesis and consequent line of action. Section 3 provides empirical tests about the success 
of the supply-driven program. Interpretation of the results is offered, especially referring to 
the community environment. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The context of the study area 
2.1 Geographical and demographical background 
Peru is the fourth largest country in Latin America. It is divided into three well-
differentiated zones: (i) the Pacific coastal area, a narrow desert slice of land (11% of the 
whole territory), in which economic and political activities are concentrated in the productive 
valleys that command irrigation; (ii) the Andean highlands – hereafter Sierra – (30% of the 
whole territory), in which agriculture is the main economic activity despite the prevailing 
aridity and abrupt changes in temperature; and (iii) the tropical lowlands, where forest 
exploitation as well as tropical agriculture (and petroleum extraction) predominate. 
The present work concentrates on the Southern Sierra, where it is estimated that 4,000 
native communities are located. Around 325,000 rural households of indigenous origin are 
living there, which represents 5% of the national population (according to the 2007 
Population Census). They represent highly scattered settlements, some of which remain fairly 
isolated to date, where the Spanish language is hardly spoken but several dialects are used 
instead.  In our study area, Quechua is the main spoken language. Native (or peasant) 
communities are social organization units that are formally recognized by the New Political 
Constitution of Peru. Moreover, they are conserving their traditional cultures and tribal 
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characteristics to a great extent. These are, mainly, direct democracy and rotating leadership, 
solidarity networks (ayni groups), low technicality and spatial mobility in production, 
collective property of some land and worshipping of nature. This being said, the last decades 
have witnessed important migration waves towards urban centers and the intrusion of 
modernity in the countryside.  
Throughout recent history, the hyper-centralization of economic activities along the 
Coast has deprived the Sierra of public investments and proper policies aimed at improving 
technology and developing commercial agriculture3. Hence, several authors explain that the 
Sierra’s narrow dependence of both crop distribution and productivity on climatic and land 
conditions is principally due to the lack of use of modern techniques and the distance from 
markets [e.g. Gonzales de Olarte, 1994]. Indeed, while the productive Coast enjoys good 
interconnections trough the Panamerican road and a network of perpendicular secondary 
roads, the Sierra is mostly left away from the transportation ways and is therefore driven by a 
self-sufficiency logic (see below)4. As a matter of fact, we observe that the agriculture of the 
(Southern) Sierra concurrently encounters many obstacles: very small and fragmented 
farming units, little irrigation, no full-fledged private property on land, segmented and low 
quality markets, and especially poor technology and knowledge in farming activities 
[Mazurek et al., 1998]. Therefore, today, the crucially-needed modernization of rural 
agriculture hinges on the access to adequate training and technology [Mazurek et al., 1998; 
Lacki and Marcenado, 2003], which the project under study aims at. 
The two rural development projects under study take place in the Sicuani and 
neighboring districts from the Canchis province, in the Cusco department (South-East of 
Peru). The province is located at an average altitude of 3,700 meters above the sea level and 
extends around an Interandean valley called Vilcanota, which makes up three distinct 
ecological and production zones. In the valley floor (3500 to 3600 meters above sea level), 
                                                 
3 This hierarchy has been the consequence, above all, of the selection of a specific model of economic 
development, somehow dictated by the spatial configuration of the country. As a matter of fact, population 
dispersal and mountainous relief lead to very high per-capita cost of providing infrastructure to remote areas (in 
addition to technical obstacles). Moreover, tax collection is very costly in those areas as well, which somehow 
legitimates a lower provision of public goods. Finally, this situation of a favored Coast also results from the 
culture of “passivity” and the low ability to undertake collective actions of Sierra peasants (mainly due to low 
educational levels and communication means, as well as to strong aid-dependence). 
4 To give an idea of the importance of the deficit, here follow some statistics from our field survey.  The average 
distance from the sample communities to the nearest town, using the means of transportation available, is 
exceeding one hour (77 minutes). Actually, 17% of them had no road or hardly motorable tracks to connect their 
living place, and only 60% had an all-weather asphalted road within reasonable reach. Finally, 70% of them are 
located in the valley floor, which makes the reported findings all the more impressive. As a matter of fact, in the 
top zone, the situation is much worse; for instance, one of the sample communities could only be reached by 
horse, after a fulll-day journey. 
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people mainly grow corn, broad beans, wheat and vegetables. They usually devote half of 
their time to cattle farming (bovines, sheep, pork, and poultry), depending on land 
availability. In the mountainside zone (3600 to 4000 meters above sea level), the chief crops 
are hybrid potato (i.e. modern varieties), barley, olluco and oca (two traditional tuber crops). 
Cattle to be found there are mainly sheep and alpacas. Finally, in the top zone (high mountain 
grasslands, from 4000 to 4800 meters above sea level), agriculture is virtually impossible, 
except for some native potato species. The main activity and means of subsistence is the 
herding of lamas and alpacas, whose entire body is made use of.  
The 2006 UNDP Human Development Report gives the Canchis province a HDI score 
of 0.5076, roughly identical to the average score of sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, in the 
environment of this study, isolation and self-consumption combine with low technological 
levels and little TA, to give rise to extreme poverty pockets5. Economic poverty leads, among 
other things, to a low nutritional quality of the food consumed, which is in turn reflected in a 
chronic child malnutrition rate as high as 38% and in one of the lowest life expectancies of 
the country (less than 60 years). Besides, the area faces a major educational problem, which is 
due to high absenteeism of the pupils (mainly due to economic impossibility for the family to 
bear education costs) and ineffectiveness of the formal educational system (due to poor 
educational programs, failure to accommodate linguistic diversity, bad professional 
qualification and low wages for teachers). Thus, even though the average schooling in the 
area lies around seven years (i.e. incomplete secondary education), 30% of the current rural 
population is still illiterate.  
2.2 Economic environment 
Let us briefly explain the importance of the challenge at hand. Remoteness, 
underdeveloped infrastructure, high exposure to natural hazards, cultural and liquidity 
constraints are automatically reflected in wide differentials between prices paid by final 
consumers (purchase price) and those received by primary producers (farm-gate selling price). 
It is thus easy to understand that most Andean peasants, who definitely face those types of 
constraints, are locked in a semi-closed economy: many of the items that they produce and 
consume are non-tradeables on world, national and often even regional markets. The vicious 
                                                 
5 At the national level, 76.5% of the rural population in the Sierra is living below the domestically-defined 
poverty line and about 50% is considered as extremely poor, in spite of the strong economic growth experienced 
by the country since 2002 (INEI, 2006). 
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circle resulting from the situation of physical isolation is illustrated by the figure presented 
below (adapted from Platteau 2000, p. 50). 
Figure 1: The effects of physical isolation on the development of Andean markets 
 
A direct consequence of the segmented nature of markets is that, once an output level 
is reached that satisfies the current household demand (for consumption, storage, bartering, 
and solidarity obligations), marginal utility of extra effort is very low (since it would be 
barely profitable). Peasants are then likely to prefer an activity out of the farming unit, which 
can generate immediate cash and thus loosen their liquidity constraint (especially during the 
lean season)6. As a result, given the restricted scope of output markets and the context of 
pervasive market failures, investments required for agricultural intensification will hardly take 
place spontaneously in the environment under study  (especially in the most isolated areas). 
Similarly, forcing peasants into adopting intensification practices (possibly by giving them 
some assets), as many development projects used to do, is doomed to fail. This is what the 
“outlet constraint” in figure 1 refers to. 
In addition, recourse to work exchange groups (ayni), though necessary in the absence 
of formal insurance schemes, goes hand in hand with low productivity. True, they represent 
valuable risk-pooling arrangements and allow expanding every individual’s production 
                                                 
6 A whole range of peasant goods can only be acquired through money, because no member from the social 
network produces them (those are new substitutes for traditional goods or new necessities, services, agricultural 
inputs). Moreover, it is clear that those “imported goods” are getting more and more important. 
Physical isolation 
High transaction costs | Poor quality of production | Low productivity 
Underdeveloped infrastructure | Low human and physical capital 
No 
intensification 
Segmented product markets | Imperfect factor markets 
Capability constraint 
Physical constraint 
Outlet constraint  
Liquidity constraint 
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frontier given the traditional diversification strategies of the peasants7. Yet, this is a second-
best optimality: due to the well-known incentive problems plaguing collective action, efforts 
applied on individual plots are most likely to be suboptimal.  Moreover, the prevalence of 
low-quality labor is in turn reinforced by very low amounts of human and physical capital in 
the hands of peasants. This is the “capability constraint” in figure 1. Obviously, poor 
infrastructure also directly limits intensification possibilities (see the “physical constraint” on 
the figure). 
Lastly, the same constraints greatly affect the development of factor markets (e.g. 
land, financial and, central to this work, TA services). First, as a corollary from the above 
discussion, demand for those services is likely to be very limited (i.e. low reservation price 
and elastic individual demand curves). Second, money is scarce in the Andean economy; 
exchanges are often settled through informal credit (e.g. among ayni groups) and barter. 
Moreover, the prevailing culture of aid dependence in the area (many public and private 
programs used to follow a gift logic) certainly exacerbates the limited willingness-to-pay of 
peasants. Third, linguistic and cultural barriers are strongly at play: it is typically very hard 
for peasants, who have limited education and speak mainly the Quechua language, to identify 
suppliers (usually living in town), to play on competition between them, or simply to 
understand the information provided. This asymmetry of information is the source of much 
abuse: for instance, many peasants reported that suppliers often used out-of-date products or 
charged too much (“for the bother”). Furthermore, as explained above, material conditions are 
very poor. Finally, appropriate technology doesn’t always exist, due to lack of in situ 
experimentation, especially for the most elevated zones where effective farming conditions 
widely diverge because of different conditions of soil, rainfall, elevation and slope. The 
“liquidity constraint” in figure 1 refers to the necessity for peasants to rely on their own 
resources.   
As far as agricultural modernization is concerned, defeating the logic that we have just 
described is certainly not easy. Actions on the both sides of the problem are needed: making 
intensification practices more feasible (through closer, better and cheaper TA) and profitable 
(through higher trade opportunities).  
                                                 
7 Peasants typically manage several plots of land with different characteristics (especially in terms of irrigation 
and property regime) and located at different altitude levels. This is mainly aimed at avoiding land overuse, and 
at diversifying the crop mix and the multiple risks of the Andean environment. 
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3. Two approaches to stimulating innovation in poor areas 
In the South-East of the Cusco department, we witnessed two development projects 
aimed at accelerating technological change in rural areas. On one hand, the Kamayoq School 
is a training center for poor farmers, which was set up in 1996 by a Peruvian Non-
Governmental Organization called “Soluciones Prácticas ITDG” (hereafter ITDG)8. On the 
other hand, the Corridor Project is a temporary partnership started in 2001 between the IFAD 
and the Peruvian government (through a loan agreement) and focuses demand conditions.  
This work is about the first project. Nevertheless, the presence of another program in 
the same area, which is addressing the same failure of a given market in a fundamentally 
different way, provides an interesting perspective while specifying the NGO’s project. 
Moreover, the two projects are intimately linked since some ITDG beneficiaries are using the 
other project to develop a business and the Corridor project benefits from the presence of the 
TA suppliers trained by ITDG. Even so, the budget, intervention area and objectives of the 
two projects are very different9.  
3.1 The Kamayoq School 
In 1985, the first office outside Europe of ITDG was created in Peru. There, it is 
“tackling poverty through the generation of practical technological innovations in partnership 
with resource-poor rural producers” [ITDG, 2006: 10; own translation].  
Created in 1996, the “Kamayoq School” was designed to train peasants as new 
suppliers of TA and innovation promoters, active in poor and remote communities of the 
area10. In addition, several farmer consultants are also active for an array of institutions 
(including the Corridor Project). Therefore, by organizing (and financing) farmer training, 
ITDG promotes a genuine local market for agricultural and livestock extension services that 
reach rural poor and hence allows overcoming the isolation failure. The general working 
hypothesis is that peasants are ready to take steps to solve their problems and improve their 
                                                 
8 The former and original name of the NGO if Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG). 
9 The overall budget of the Corridor Project is USD 30.9 million and it is working in 136 districts from 15 
provinces of the departments of Cusco and Puno. By contrast, the budget to organize one promotion of the 
Kamayoq School is between USD 20 and 50 thousand (according to the last three promotions), and Practical 
Action is active in 6 districts from one province (Canchis). The Corridor Project should end in early 2008. 
Consequently, the aim of this work has never been not to draw any comparison of the respective impacts. 
10 The appellation « Kamayoq » comes from Inca times and means (in old Quechua) specialists, professionals or 
investigators (such as, for instance, the quipu kamayoq, who knew the knots and colors codes used to 
communicate in the Inca Empire, or the chaca kamayoq, who were the bridge wardens). Some development 
institutions (e.g. PRODERM) started to reintroduce the appellation in the mid-eighties to refer to expert 
peasants, with a view to revalorizing native culture. Note that the term Kamayoq admits no plural. 
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living conditions (and to pay for that). However, they do not find adequate answers under 
present conditions, i.e. the existing supply of TA is unable to satisfy the latent demand. ITDG 
thinks that farmer-to-farmer transfers of experience and knowledge are most effective and that 
it is possible to take advantage of the potential for innovation among the rural poor. 
Moreover, thanks to the (ever-) lasting presence of the new community-based consultants, the 
existing demand can gradually expand (through training as well as imitation effects), which 
can trigger a sustainable and accelerating move towards agriculture modernization and 
poverty reduction. 
The training puts strong emphasis on the value of local knowledge and peasant 
experimentation with novelties: “the objective is that they eventually become promoters of 
adequate technological alternatives themselves, with the ability to generate creative solutions 
to local production problems” [La Cruz et al., 2004: 13; own translation]. ITDG created a 
pivotal assembly where heads of target communities and the NGO’s staff discuss the 
unfolding of the activities, the use of the budget, the training’s contents, etc. The training is 
bilingual and highly practical11. In this sense, the Kamayoq School really fills a gap in Peru’s 
formal educational system, which is largely designed to benefit urban families from the high 
and middle classes (even as far as agricultural education is concerned). 
ITDG bases its intervention on traditional rural institutions, local culture, and non-
formal economic relationships, in order to accelerate sustainable changes. All the candidates 
must first be selected by their community in order to participate in the School before being 
interviewed by the staff. Moreover, the Kamayoq are well-settled community members, 
always available to anyone who needs assistance and is ready to pay for it. They perfectly 
know the local culture (including the language) and ways of doing things. They are 
trustworthy villagers. Finally, they ask for lower remuneration than urban professionals since 
they face much lower transaction as well as living costs, and they accept a whole range of 
means of payment, in tune with their environment (i.e. payment in hours of work - through 
ayni group, crops or other products and money). 
At the time of our fieldwork, the Kamayoq School had trained around 180 peasants 
since its foundation, who have attended to more than three thousand farming families. This 
                                                 
11 The approach follows the methodology Farmer Field School, first developed by the FAO in the late eighties 
for East-Asian rice-based systems and today promoted by many development agencies (including the World 
Bank), as a more effective approach to extend science-based knowledge and practices [Feder et al., 2004]. 
“Through interactive learning and field experimentation, FFS programs teach farmers how to experiment and 
problem-solve independently, with the expectation that they will thus require fewer extension services and will 
be able to adapt the technologies to their own environmental and cultural needs” [Godtland et al., 2004: 2]. 
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represented in six cohorts of graduates (one cohort is around one year duration, see table in 
appendix 2). After the three first cohorts, the NGO operated an important modification of its 
line of action. It bears noticing that this switch was exogenously-driven, due to a lack of 
financing. The main change between the two waves was the reorientation towards specialized 
training on one particular topic instead of general – but also more superficial – training 
covering several subjects. In addition, the NGO ended input gifts to graduates. The habit to 
grant sheds, seeds, drugs and other materials to graduates was replaced by a shop with loan 
facilities.  
Finally, graduates from the School, with the support of ITDG, have set up a Kamayoq 
Organization, aimed at guaranteeing a certain sustainability in the service supply, managing it 
collectively (e.g. on institutional markets), and organizing refreshing and updating courses. It 
is currently building up and is likely to play a crucial role a few years hence. 
3.2 The Corridor Puno-Cusco Development Project 
The Corridor Project seeks to “increase rural and urban incomes in the Puno-Cusco 
area by supporting agricultural production and development of the manufacturing and 
services sectors by micro- and small-scale enterprises.” [IFAD, 2007: website].  
We are specifically interested in one sub-component of the program, called 
“strengthening of rural markets”, which aims at fostering the development of rural markets of 
TA by facilitating the meeting of demand and supply12. In order to do so, it does not provide 
any training but instead enables peasants’ demand for TA through important subsidies 
(typically 90% of the costs). It postulates that there exists an adequate stock of suppliers (even 
for the poorest zones), which is made up from high school graduates and facilitators who got 
trained by numerous previous development projects13. Therefore, to overcome the under-
utilization of available professionals, and to develop sustainable service markets, genuine 
demand must be created, backed by sufficient wherewithal [Haudry de Soucy, 1998]. The 
underlying hypothesis is that, upon completion of the project (normally one year), 
beneficiaries will have developed businesses strong enough to enable them to buy technical 
assistance. The need for income generation is strongly emphasized and the subsidized 
assistance always involves commercialization issues.  
                                                 
12 The other components of the Project include: strengthening of financial services, product certification and 
access to legal recognition (identity cards etc.).  
13 Interestingly, the project nevertheless offered training to the suppliers hired by the beneficiaries, which were 
actually taken by almost half of the suppliers. 
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The peculiarity of the Corridor Project is thus that it acts on demand conditions. In a 
nutshell, its intervention amounts to paying the wage of professionals whom peasants decide 
to hire in order to receive technical assistance (as well as for training trips, incentives etc.). 
The money first goes to a bank account under the control of the leaders of the peasant 
community and is disbursed in successive tranches, conditional on favorable reports to the 
institution14. In addition, the Project supplies facilitators to help beneficiaries to work their 
way through various administrative steps such as accountancy, report writing, contract 
signing and monitoring. Peasants are thus assumed to have well-defined needs and are, 
indeed, selected on the basis of contests in which they are asked to formulate a micro-
development plan for their community.  
3.3 Graphical representation of the interventions 
Figure 2 below presents a stylized community market for rural services. Peasants’ 
demand (D1) is modeled as being low and very elastic, as a result from the weak purchasing 
power of peasants – whose demand stays most often unsatisfied – and the existence of 
“substitutes” 15. Professionals’ supply (S1) does not exist below minimum quantity and price 
(Pmin) – which is high given transaction costs – and is rather inelastic: urban suppliers are not 
much willing to increase effort and go to remote communities, because they have relatively 
good business opportunities in town where they can sell veterinarian products and supply 
assistance to larger farming units. In addition, the rural market is characterized by high entry 
costs, especially in terms of social and cultural investment, so that expansion is constrained. 
As a matter of fact, in most communities, a market equilibrium involving positive quantities 
of assistance is not feasible, as shown in the figure by the absence of intersection between the 
curves S1 and D1.  
As shown in the left-hand side figure, the ITDG intervention increases existing supply, 
especially for low prices. The new supply (S2) starts from a lower level, since farmer 
consultants accept lower remuneration. As it happens, some of them even supply positive 
quantities at no charge, out of solidarity and/or duty feelings. S2 is also likely to be more 
elastic, as the peasant consultants are more flexible (living on the spot) and accept a wider 
array of payment modalities. As a result, an interior equilibrium is now achievable, in which 
potentially large quantities are supplied at low prices. In a second stage, the project is 
                                                 
14 In practice, every selected community receives USD 5,000 that is shared amongst the constituted groups of the 
community (usually four). 
15 This means carrying on with traditional technology or letting animals die. Even if TA could be regarded as a 
“necessity” for peasants given its potential impact, poverty and isolation rather make it a “luxury”. 
Constraints to agricultural innovation: a market approach  - 13 - 
 
supposed to induce a gradual demand increase, which will raise further the quantities 
exchanged on the rural market. Yet, the assistance that Kamayoq can deliver is likely to reach 
a limit beyond a certain level, due to poor physical and human infrastructure (on the graph, S2 
gets steeper). However, at that point, professional supply is more likely to be available to 
relatively richer and more technologically advanced farmers (and S1 comes back in). 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of two interventions on a local TA market 
 
On the right-hand side figure, the Corridor Project is shown to expand demand by 
means of large subsidies, which creates a wedge between the price received by suppliers (Ps) 
and that paid by users (Pd). Most of the subsidy is passed on to the suppliers as a result of the 
high elasticity of demand. As can be seen from figure 2, this way of overcoming peasants’ 
isolation allows positive quantities to be exchanged on the market, but at relatively high 
prices (needed to attract suppliers), which may thwart the program’s sustainability (if high 
transaction costs arise again as soon as the subsidies stop).  
 
4 Empirical tests of the merits of the supply-based approach 
This section aims at assessing the empirical relevance of the supply-based extension 
model. It characterizes the market fostered by the intervention of ITDG, and identifies some 
key determinants of the program’s effectiveness. We perform three analyses, based on 
different layers of data. First, a mean analysis tests some initial assumptions and provides a 
first idea about the performance of the strategy. Then, an econometric model confirms the 
main determinants of consultants’ activity, as measured by different indicators. Finally, data 
from our survey is used to deliver some intuitions about the actual scope of the newly created 
market.  
Quantity 
Price 
S1 
D1 
D2 
subsidy 
Pd 
Ps 
Quantity 
Price 
S1 
S2 
D1 
Pmin Pmin 
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Let us state our main conclusion from the onset: it appears desirable to train specialists 
as opposed to generalists. Although this was not obvious per se, the switch operated by the 
NGO from one tactic to the other (after the third cohort) unequivocally led to a greater 
efficiency. In addition, other variables suggest that (i) personal characteristics such as age and 
education matter for some activities (but not the sex) and (ii) Kamayoq are best thought as 
local complements rather than substitutes to existing commercial suppliers: they seem to be 
best adapted to places and/or topics that are not currently touched, thus solving the isolation 
trap. In those conditions, a marketable demand for rural services in poor and remote areas 
exists. Nevertheless, this demand appears limited in many cases, as the last point of this 
section discusses. 
4.1  Data 
We use two data sources. First, we gathered information about Kamayoq graduates 
from ITDG office, as well as some basic geographical and demographical information from 
the local office of the Agriculture Ministry (such as the location, population and area of 
villages). These data are used for the quantitative analysis. Then, we conducted a field survey 
in the target area between October and December 2005, in order to deepen our understanding 
of the development projects under study. We randomly selected communities from the three 
altitude zones, which had received (or were receiving) the assistance of ITDG or the Corridor 
Project, or both16. We interviewed 65 different individuals from 20 communities, comprising 
beneficiaries of both projects and external witnesses (community leaders and villagers). For 
each of them, we collected information about community, personal characteristics, and 
specific project-related variables. Some basic descriptive statistics about our sample can be 
found in appendix 1. In this paper, we focus only on the data about members of ITDG-treated 
communities (i.e. comprising at least one Kamayoq)17.  
A great part of this paper is based on the analysis of the activity of Kamayoq 
graduates. To measure it, we rely on four different sources for each graduate: (i) the activity 
state at survey time, as perceived by the local staff of ITDG (ii) the use of the NGO’s input 
shop over the years 2004 and 2005, (iii) the participation in official SENASA sanitation 
                                                 
16 The sets of beneficiaries of the two projects intersect. In our sample, 11 Kamayoq are also Corridor group 
members and 2 have been hired as Corridor suppliers. 
17 Demont (2006) discusses the whole data. 
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campaigns since 2002 (collected from the registers of the Agriculture Ministry)18, and (iv) the 
presence in an official listing set up by the Ministry of Social Affairs, which contains all the 
TA suppliers from the area, by specialty. Those four pieces of binary information are then 
combined to determine whether a graduate is active or not (in the absence of actual activity 
measures for the entire population). The reason we combine them is that none of the four 
measures is likely to reflect the actual activity rate for all graduates and with full accuracy. 
Arguably, the first indicator is a subjective and potentially conservative estimate (though we 
cross-checked the information by different reliable staff members who have been there since 
the start of the School). Second, you can possibly be active without having to buy seeds, 
drugs or other materials at the NGO’s shop (though the long distance to and the high prices of 
private shops make it highly relevant, as indicated by its important use by graduates). Third, 
sanitation campaigns are specific for graduates trained in stockbreeding and/or animal 
sanitation. Finally, the official listing might fail to list some “unobtrusive” individuals and 
does not have data about the last cohort’s graduates (since it was written before the end of the 
training). Nevertheless, when combined, we believe they deliver a fair idea of the activity 
state of the graduates. We check that the four measures are strongly positively correlated with 
each other. Moreover, for the graduates in our sample, we observe a strong correlation 
between those indicators and the actual activity measures that we gathered during the survey. 
The correlation matrix is provided in appendix. 
4.2  Overview 
At this stage, we should make clear what we understand by success for the program at 
hand. The supply of services very rarely represents the main activity of Kamayoq. First, the 
trained peasants keep working within their own farm, because the low remuneration of the 
services they supply cannot usually provide the mainstay of their subsistence. Moreover, they 
are trained to be innovators (and not resellers), so that they need to be able to use and 
experiment with the techniques they promote. Thus, the priority for the Kamayoq is to 
improve their own family business, thereby doing empirical research and demonstrating new 
techniques to fellow villagers. It is only in a second stage that they will seek to sell out TA in 
their community. Ultimately, the very successful Kamayoq can get contracted by an array of 
                                                 
18 The Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agraria (SENASA) is a department of the Agriculture Ministry that 
organizes sanitation campaigns across the country, hiring local professionals. It is associated in Kamayoq 
training and then invites the successful graduates to participate in official campaigns. 
Constraints to agricultural innovation: a market approach  - 16 - 
 
external institutions. Our success indicators are thus chosen to tackle those different levels of 
activity. 
To begin with, this section reports mean activity scores that simply average the four 
binary information sources listed above, in order to get a crude activity index for each 
graduate19. Table 1 distinguishes specific subgroups of (i) the entire population of the School 
and (ii) the sample that we interviewed during our field survey. The classification across the 
different columns relies on some basic assumptions suggested by our fieldwork. First, as 
explained, there has been an important change in the School’s training policy after the 3 first 
cohorts, and we expect it to have an impact on the activity rate of the graduates. We think that 
not only the topic of the training matters (i.e. animal sanitation for the last three cohorts – see 
appendix 3), but the reorganization towards a more efficient, specialized training. Column 
four makes the distinction. Second, a successful Kamayoq probably needs to be a middle-aged 
peasant who is well anchored in her community, in order to (i) know suitable farming 
techniques, (ii) stay in the place on a lasting basis and (iii) command a good relationship 
network. That is, variables such as age, marital status, number of children etc. could matter 
for the activity rate of the graduates. Third, relatively educated peasants are can probably 
better understand and to put in practice the training they received. Finally, women are likely 
to encounter important barriers to supplying services out of the farm20. 
The first observation to make is that many Kamayoq are “inactive”, as shown by the 
low mean scores that are reported in the table. In the graduates’ population, 38% are reported 
as inactive by the four information sources that we use and 71% do not reach an average score 
of 0.5. However, there is a significantly higher activity rate for the three last cohorts: 40% of 
the graduates are recorded as active by at least two criteria. Broadly speaking, this means that, 
in a three-year period (between 2002 and 2005), the strategy delivered 37 new rural experts 
who are actually innovating on their own farm and supplying basic services in 28 different 
communities. Although it could be higher, this is certainly not negligible. As a result, we have 
some indications that the supply-based extension model is broadly relevant, though failures 
exist. 
 
                                                 
19 The MIMDES listing was made at the time of the sixth promotion and does not contain the last graduates from 
the Kamayoq School, for whom the activity index therefore does not comprise that fourth information source. 
20 As a matter of fact, Andean wives often have to stay home to look after children and small animals, sometimes 
needing their husband’s permission to go out. Moreover, when they do manage to work outside, they often suffer 
from machismo and opprobrium for not speaking or writing good Spanish, which leads to lower confidence and 
payments from buyers.  
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Table 1: Kamayoq activity variable [0-1]: mean analysis, by subgroups 
Population Whole 
population 
Three last 
cohorts 
Animal 
sanitation 
Age between 
25 and 45 
No 
children 
Only primary 
education 
Male 
All graduates 
186 individuals a/ 0.28 
0.38 *** n.a. 0.32 0.23 * 0.22 *** 0.29 
Sample 
26 individuals 
0.36 0.60 *** 0.51 ** 0.35 0.25 0.31 0.39 
Source: registers of the Kamayoq School (line 1) and own survey (line 2). 
*** Reported mean is different from the rest of the population at a 1% level of confidence, ** at a 5% level of 
confidence and * at a 10% level of confidence (using t-test). 
 a/ The age, children and education statistics are computed excluding the first promotion for which the NGO 
could not provide information (except for the surveyed Kamayoq). 
Overall, the table thus confirms the above predictions, though not always significantly. 
The change operated after the first three cohorts of the School appears to contribute to 
significantly higher activity rates for graduates. Moreover, the topic of the training does not 
seem to be the sole explanation: some graduates from the first wave are specifically engaged 
in animal sanitation and, although they do better than the average for all cohorts, they are not 
as active as the average graduate for the second wave. Let us finally note that our survey 
selected Kamayoq slightly more active than the average (the difference is significant at the 
10% level of confidence). 
4.3  Econometric confirmation 
We now focus on the data obtained from ITDG’s records, which have the advantages 
of being rather objective and complete (they have been recorded for all 160 graduates from 
cohorts 2 to 6). Therefore, many biases are avoided, including sample selection bias. Good 
data coverage allows us to estimate econometrically the determinants of Kamayoq’s activity 
and thus test the robustness of the above results.  
The aim is not to predict values but instead to identify the ceteris paribus effect of 
some key variables (and their relative importance) on the probability of peasant consultants to 
be more or less active. We use a multinomial probit approach. We regress three activity 
indicators – namely, the NGO’s perception, the use of the input shop and the participation in 
SENASA campaigns – on a same set of independent variables, while taking into account that 
the three measures are correlated. This technique has the advantage of delivering valid 
estimates for each activity indicator, thus avoiding any arbitrary and hard-to-read aggregation. 
The fourth information, the presence in the MIMDES listing, is not available for the graduates 
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from the last cohort and is therefore regressed separately (using a univariate probit) to avoid a 
too big loss of precision. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. 
For every individual, we regress the activity variables on a “first wave” dummy 
variable, which takes the value 1 if the individual was trained in the first three cohorts, and on 
two sets of characteristics: those of the individual and those of the community to which she 
belongs: 
Activityi = β0 + β1 * firstwavei + β2 * Xi + β3 * Ci + εi  
 
The X vector includes the following individual variables: gender, age, number of 
children, years of schooling, experience (i.e. time elapsed since graduation) and poverty 
(proxied by low land or cattle ownership). The C vector consists of the following community 
variables: an altitude dummy that indicates whether the community lies in the valley or 
higher, the number of Kamayoq suppliers in the community (competition – or collaboration – 
effect), total population and surface area (demand for services). Every explanatory variable is 
taken at its selection-time value (i.e. before any effect of the training has materialized), 
avoiding any simultaneity bias. Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics about the 
variables that are used. Table 3 gives the results of the ‘full’ regression, controlling for the 
size of the market, i.e. the community’s population and number of suppliers. Yet, this comes 
at the cost of a reduced number of observations since we are unfortunately missing the 
population data for some communities (which were not in the Ministry records). We provide 
the results of the ‘basic’ regression in appendix, which maximizes the number of 
observations. Our results are anyway very robust across specifications21.  
                                                 
21 Many specifications were actually investigated; all showing very similar results in terms of significance and 
magnitude of the main variables. Table 3 excludes the variables surface area and number of children (which are 
never individually nor jointly significant, and whose effect is a priori unclear), in order to maximize the number 
of observations and thus the accuracy of the model in revealing the magnitude of the variables of main interest 
(those variables were not available for some individuals and hence force to reduce the number of draws when 
calculating the simulated likelihood). Similarly, we opt for a single measure for wealth, mixing cattle and land 
ownership, in order to maximize the number of observations and to apply to different farming profiles. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std deviation Minimum Maximum 
NGO’s perception .578 .495 0 1 
Shop use .140 .348 0 1 
SENASA campaigns .113 .317 0 1 
MIMDES listing .285 .453 0 1 
First wave .505 .501 0 1 
Sex .828 .378 0 1 
Age 34.90 8.73 18 63 
Children 2.75 1.98 0 9 
Education (years) 8.05 2.70 3 13 
Cattle ownership (heads) 59.75 71.91 1 470 
Land ownership (ha) 13.62 31.53 0 100 
Poor 1/ .339 .475 0 1 
Experience 2/ 4.56 3.09 0.5 9 
Valley location .683 .467 0 1 
Number of Kamayoq 4.50 2.83 1 13 
Surface area (ha) 1562.9 1403.98 155 9786 
Population (people) 917.10 542.525 36 2642 
1/ takes one if the household owns less land or cattle than the 25th percentile of the 
population living on the same ecological floor (and zero otherwise). 
2/ measuring the time elapsed since graduation. 
 
The variable of main interest, “first wave”, is very negative and significant for all 
success indicators. Having been trained in the first wave significantly reduces the probability 
of being recorded as active, by about 50% on average22. The theme of the training certainly 
plays an important role: it might be easier to supply animal sanitation services (which have 
been the object of training for the last cohorts – see appendix 2) than services in irrigation or 
forestry for instance, because they have a more obvious and immediate economic value. But 
there is probably more than that: candidates who receive a specialized and deep training on 
one single topic are more likely to be active. It is important to note that there was no change 
in the selection process between the three first holistic waves and the three last ones, and that 
we control for a whole range of physical and demographic factors, so that the negative 
coefficient that we find in the data can be seen as a true consequence of the change in training 
policy. Still, a potential bias to this conclusion lies in the mere fact that the first wave is older. 
                                                 
22 Marginal effects are computed as F(x*beta | first wave=1) - F(x*beta | first wave=0), where x is the vector of 
all explanatory variables taken at their median value, beta is the vector of coefficient estimates and F is the 
cumulative normal distribution (for every equation). The reported average is for the 3 equations regressed 
jointly. It is even higher if we add the fourth equation. 
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However, such a bias exists only if time is thought to erode Kamayoq’s activity rate, which is 
not obvious at all from our field observations. To the contrary, the experience variable seems 
to indicate that some time is needed before a graduate is able to develop any activity (positive 
and decreasing effect of experience). Similarly, replacing the first wave variable by cohort 
dummies confirms that the three first cohorts are significantly less active than the sixth, while 
the fourth – which is the beginning of the second wave and was already more than three years 
old at survey time – is insignificant, as is the fifth. Finally, a Ramsey test for omitted variables 
actually fails to signal such a bias (p-value of 90%).  
Let us briefly comment results regarding some of the remaining variables. 
Interestingly, sex does not seem to play a significant role (except maybe for shop use). This 
result is somehow surprising: even if it is weakening, gender discrimination is still deeply 
rooted in the Andean society. Therefore, it might signal the success of the program in training 
proud and emancipated women as well as in making their environment change through 
promotional activities, meetings with community leaders etc. Being poor, defined as 
commanding little land or cattle with respect to other farmers from the same ecological floor, 
significantly reduces the activity rate by 24% on average. This is an important effect, which 
ought not be neglected: leaders need to have a minimum asset base to practice. Finally, we 
observe a negative effect of being located in the valley floor (not significant in the ‘full’ 
version of the model). Higher communities tend to have more active Kamayoq, which could 
indicate that the strategy under study is better adapted to remote areas than to places that are 
relatively close to towns and enjoy relatively better communication links. Distant 
communities can trigger more activity for resident Kamayoq, as a result of lower competition 
from urban professionals and closer interpersonal ties, among others. 
Education doesn’t seem to play a crucial role, which is good news as far as the 
‘inclusive’ character of the program is concerned. Schooling tends to have a positive and 
decreasing effect, but is significant only for the participation to official sanitation campaigns. 
Some minimum education is probably required to understand to contents of the training and to 
“market oneself” effectively afterwards. Yet, graduates with (more than) complete secondary 
education have significantly more income and outside opportunities, so that they could be less 
active as community consultants - in the SENASA and the shop equations, the maximum of 
the quadratic function is around nine, while complete secondary education is ten years23. For 
                                                 
23 The negative coefficient in the NGO equation is somewhat misleading since the minimum of the function is at 
6 years, after which the impact of education is actually positive (e.g. for the median individual). Besides, note 
that a traditional ‘ability bias’ is unlikely to drive the results, since schooling is largely exogenously-determined 
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the median individual (8 years of education), one extra year of education increases the 
probability of being active by 15 to 40%, depending on the equation considered. 
Controlling for the market size does not bring major changes relative to the ‘basic’ 
results (see appendix), but unveils an interesting effect of the number of leaders per 
community. Competition –or delegation – seems to be at play: having more than one graduate 
in a given community decreases the individual probability of being active. Yet, beyond a 
certain number of leaders (in the data, above 5), the probability of being active increases 
again, perhaps indicating that a critical mass can lead the community and undertake larger 
projects more easily. Although this observation has also potentially important policy-design 
implications, we do not want to put too much trust in the exact coefficients since the number 
of graduates could fail to be strictly exogenous. More ‘dynamic’ community might have sent 
more members to the School (although the latter operates a selection, partly trying to balance 
participation) and, at the same time, allow graduates to be more active, which would bias 
upwards the coefficients (so that the effect of extra leaders would in fact be even more 
negative in this case). 
Reassuringly, the main results – especially regarding the first wave variable – prove to 
be robust and consistent across different specifications and across the different activity 
indicators (the likelihood ratio test for no correlation between the equations has a p-value over 
99%, showing the importance of having modeled this correlation explicitly). Our model 
explains between 25 and 35% of data variation. It is clear that our limited data could not 
capture some very important – yet hard to observe – determinants such as personal 
motivation, farming ability, or community externalities. Nevertheless, our simple setup 
appears to pick some reliable determinants of the activity rate of the farmer consultants, 
which can probably be generalized to most development project based on training local 
experts. Farmers with some minimum education and asset base who are trained on one single 
topic are the most likely to become true technological leaders who can effectively supply 
services to their community on a lasting basis.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(by wealth for instance), is largely orthogonal to the topics touched by Kamayoq, and is fairly homogenous and 
low anyway. 
Table 3: Determinants of Kamayoq’s activity (controlling for market size) 
Variables (I)  
NGO’s perception 
(II)  
Use of shop 
(III)  
SENASA 
(IV)  
Listing 
First wave 
(3 first cohorts) 
-1.902 
(0.593)*** 
- 1.066 
(0.310)*** 
-2.382 
(0.711)*** 
-2.031 
(1.040)** 
Male -0.008 
(0.296) 
0.765 
(0.461)* 
0.295 
(0.345) 
- 0.138 
(0.336) 
Years of schooling -0.143 
(0.282) 
0.430 
(0.421) 
1.058 
(0.432)** 
0.109 
(0.410) 
Years of schooling sq. 0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.024 
(0.025) 
- 0.067 
(0.027)** 
0.006 
(0.025) 
Age 0.116 
(0.088) 
0.240 
(0.098)** 
0.099 
(0.097) 
0.267 
(0.097)*** 
Age sq. -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.001)** 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.001)*** 
Valley -0.388 
(0.351) 
-0.558 
(0.367) 
0.304 
(0.338) 
0.043 
(0.687) 
Poor -0.678 
(0.247)*** 
-0.449 
(0.293) 
-0.656 
(0.323)** 
-0.468 
(0.278)* 
Number of Kamayoq -0.416 
(0.120)*** 
-0.014 
(0.165) 
-0.284 
(0.142)** 
-0.051 
(0.122) 
Number of Kamayoq 
sq. 
0.035 
(0.008)*** 
0.003 
(0.012) 
0.025 
(0.012)** 
0.008 
(0.009) 
ln(Population) 0.391 
(0.200)** 
0.078 
(0.243) 
-0.318 
(0.223) 
-0.036 
(0.216) 
Experience 0.089 
(0.200) 
b/ 0.410 
(0.214)* 
-0.265 
(0.643) 
Experience sq. 0.028 
(0.022) 
b/ -0.016 
(0.024) 
0.045 
(0.049) 
Constant - 3.053 
(2.433) 
-7.697 
(3.144)** 
-8.455 
(2.982)*** 
-5.529 
(2.973)* 
Observations a/ 138 117 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3504 0.2750 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Columns I, II and III are the results of a multivariate probit 
regression. Column IV is the result of a separate (univariate) probit regression. 
* Means a 10% level of confidence; ** a 5% level of confidence; *** a 1% level of confidence 
a/ The observations exclude the first promotion (28 individuals) and those including missing values.   
b/ The variable experience was removed from the shop equation because it was insignificant (at 10% confidence 
level) and it had a strange behavior, due to strong collinearity with other variables. 
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4.4  Local evidence about the scope of the market 
Table 4 displays the answers of members of the sample communities (Kamayoq, heads 
or other villagers) to some key questions from our survey. The last column focuses on 
communities that benefit from the presence of some graduates from the last three cohorts of 
the School, in order to bring out the ITDG strategy in its best condition of operation. Overall, 
this table confirms the positive evolution of the School’s performance. 
The first variable indicates that Kamayoq enjoy good recognition in their community, 
since all things that matter for Andean communities are actually discussed in assemblies. This 
is especially true for specialized consultants. Yet, the most interesting piece of information 
concerns the actual activity of the new leaders. More than 60% of the respondents said that 
the (specialized) Kamayoq of their community were supplying TA at least once a month and 
at least once a week in 30% of the cases, which indicates that a new market is effectively 
created. For more than 40% of the interviewees, the training actually led to concrete 
improvements in their way of farming. The peasants’ ability to pay represents the most 
critical assessment of the relevance of a supply-driven intervention. Our data suggest that 
most graduates from the second wave of the School are able to charge fellow community 
members for the services they provide them (88% of the cases). A significant share of farmer 
suppliers can earn a living by providing rural services: one transaction out of four a wage 
payment, on top of the products’ cost. Interestingly, the possibility to ask for remuneration is 
linked with the activity rate of the suppliers: in our sample, all the Kamayoq who were 
reported to supply weekly assistance were receiving money, and over 40% of them were 
earning significant incomes (i.e. charge for labor on top of products). By contrast, when 
sporadic assistance was reported, no money was involved in half of the cases. 
Table 4: Kamayoq’s activity: percentage of respondents who gave each answer 
 All cohorts Some graduates from 2nd wave 
Community speaks about Kamayoq during assemblies 57.41 70.59 *** 
Kamayoq supply regular TA 43.64 61.76 *** 
Respondent has improved her production thanks to Kamayoq 39.22 40.63 
Kamayoq charge nothing for services supplied 16.36 11.76 
Kamayoq charge products or labor a/ 16.36 17.65 
Kamayoq charge small amounts of money 30.91 35.29 
Kamayoq charge significant amounts of money 18.18 26.47 ** 
Some Kamayoq in the community are inactive 57.69 50.00 
Source: own survey (55 individuals for column 2 and 34 individuals for column 3).  *** means that the reported 
score is different from the rest of the population at a 1% level of significance and ** at a 5% level (t-test). 
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a/ This can be exchanges of crops or hours of labor among ayni groups. Note that the answers sum to more than 
one hundred, since several Kamayoq explained that they charge differently according to different situations.  
Finally, half of the interviewees said that some of the Kamayoq living in their 
community were staying idle, echoing the problem of effectiveness that we already identified 
above. The main obstacles to supplying agricultural services, as reported by the surveyed 
Kamayoq, are: lack of demand (45% of the cases), strong (professional) competition (31%), 
lack of time (31%), deficient training (9%), lack of profitability (9%), and lack of proper 
infrastructure or tools (5%).  
The difficulties mentioned suggest that (i) if the Kamayoq do not break the vicious 
circle of isolated agriculture (see section 2), they are likely to allocate too little time to the 
tasks expected from them; (ii) it is necessary for the Kamayoq to have an economic interest in 
the enterprise (especially through selling opportunities and cash income); (iii) the quality of 
training is very important, so as to allow the leaders to appropriately respond to the demand. 
As for professional competition, peasants traditionally exhibit more trust or legitimacy in 
foreign educated professionals (when those are within reach), even though they usually 
charge higher prices. However, in several cases, the reverse situation has been happening 
(even in organized competitions such as in the Corridor project), in which demand for 
professionals’ services drops once peasant experts start operating and being truly recognized 
(see Ita 2005). This shows that peasant consultants can grow through ‘market rules’, making 
use of their advantageous characteristics to enter market niches and become recognized in 
their own community. This being said, it is probably easier outside the valley floor, where 
very few private suppliers are to be found; Kamayoq are reported to supply regular assistance 
in 33% of the cases in the valley floor, in 50% of the cases in the mountainside zone and in 
78% of the cases in the top zone (even though it can refer to “autarchic” activity in the latter 
case).  
Yet, the first two obstacles show clearly that the expected creation of a new demand 
among the community of the consultants is lagging, which can be due to a series of both 
endogenous and exogenous factors, including cultural aspects and incentives problems. For 
instance, as far as the latter is concerned, asking a participation fee to the training could help 
selecting applicants and motivating graduates. Turning to cultural aspects, tribal 
characteristics are likely to limit the possibility to do ‘business’ with fellow community 
members (for a discussion at length on this issue, see for instance the seminal book of 
Platteau 2000). However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to tackle those issues. 
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5 Conclusion 
In Peru as in many countries of Latin America, the tendency in the nineties has been 
the progressive privatization of the agricultural information and the departure from the 
approach of rural extension with public good characteristics. As a result, many isolated areas 
became neglected, trapped in subsistence economies. We studied an innovative strategy for 
accelerating technological change in poor areas, engineered by a Peruvian NGO.  The 
Kamayoq School relies on the training of a network of peasant technological leaders and the 
consequent creation of rural markets for agrarian extension. Its originality lies in the fact that, 
after an initial (limited) training impulse, it relies on market and non-market relationships that 
traditionally exist within peasant communities in order to generate a self-supporting 
movement of propagation of agricultural services.  
In this paper, we have shown that such a supply-driven strategy can generate 
sustainable, wide benefits. In contrast to other development projects, the Kamayoq School 
does not require stringent favorable conditions such as access to reliable private markets and 
communication means, education and awareness of its beneficiaries, or availability of 
altruistic heads of community. Moreover, being focused on education and training, the 
program generates many externalities, which justify some public support. The training 
received by the Kamayoq benefits many people, with multiplying effects, thanks to the 
assistance provided or imitation effects. A better supply of TA – i.e. cheaper, closer, better 
adapted – can go a long way in creating an effective market for rural services in poor areas. 
Evidence reported in this paper indicates that this is especially true when relatively well-off 
peasants receive a specialized training in one relevant topic. Also, the Kamayoq are 
particularly useful in more distant areas where transaction costs are particularly high for urban 
professionals. Nevertheless, only about half of the trained peasants can currently be 
considered as genuine technological leaders and active facilitators of change in their native 
communities.  
In conclusion, in the Andean mountainous areas at least, a supply-side solution 
appears well suited to tackle the lack of rural innovations. The principles of learning by doing 
and farmer-to-farmer transfer of experience and knowledge prove to be highly effective and 
suggest that it is possible to take advantage of the potential for innovation among the rural 
poor. This is not to say that there does not exist any demand problem. But demand conditions 
are surely much harder to influence on a lasting basis and should be considered as 
endogenous to a large extent.  
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Such a conclusion can probably be applied to many similar development projects 
based on the training of peasant consultants. Several earlier surveys in Peru, India or 
elsewhere have emphasized the extensive role of social interactions between neighboring 
farmers for technology adoption in traditional, rural environments [e.g. Godtland et al. 2004; 
Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and Udry 2005]. In this respect, the Kamayoq School 
represents a highly valuable program in the light of the numerous failures and uncertainties 
usually plaguing rural education programs (see e.g. the survey by Anderson and Feder 2003). 
Moreover, contrary to many development projects, it is a largely replicable model. Ideally, 
public spending should provide the subsidy that is naturally needed for public goods such as 
the information needed to better exploit available economic opportunities. 
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Appendix 1: Basic descriptive statistics about the sample 
 Kamayoq Corridor 
beneficiaries 
Heads of communities Villagers All 
Number of individuals 26 29 14 11 65 a/ 
Sample percentage 40.0 44.6 21.5 16.9 100 a/ 
Males (%) 69.2 57.7 * 92.9 ** 81.8 71.9 
Age average 42.2 43.8 45.9 40.5 43.8 
Education average 8.2 7.6 11.9 ** 8.1 8.7 
Children average 3.2 7.0 12.6 3.4 6.9 
** Means that the reported statistics are different from the rest of the population at a 5% level of confidence and 
* at a 10% level of confidence (using t-test). 
a/ Categories overlap. 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation between activity variables for Kamayoq in 
the sample 
 NGO’s perception Shop use SENASA campaigns MIMDES listing 
NGO’s perception 1.00    
Shop use 0.219 *** 1.00   
SENASA campaigns 0.271 *** 0.444 *** 1.00  
MIMDES listing 0.483 *** 0.281 *** 0.493 *** 1.00 
New income 1/ 0.402 ** -0.052 0.098 0.428 * 
Frequency of TA 2/ 0.464 *** 0.387 ** 0.701 *** 0.756 *** 
Importance of payment 3/ 0.153 0.323 0.442 ** 0.547 ** 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 1% of confidence. 
1/ whether the Kamayoq is enjoying an extra income following her training (between 0 and 2, 1 being a small 
income and 2 being a high income) 
2/ between 0 and 4, 0 being never, 1 sporadically, 2 at least once a month, 3 at least once a week and 4 everyday. 
3/ 0 is no payment, 1 is cost of products (drugs etc.), 2 is products and wage. 
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Appendix 3: ‘basic’ regression 
Variables (I)  
NGO’s perception 
(II)  
Use of shop 
(III)  
SENASA 
(IV)  
Listing 
First wave 
(3 first cohorts) 
- 1.490 
(0.505)*** 
- 0.936 
(0.297)*** 
- 2.370 
(0.540)*** 
- 1.826 
(0.963)** 
Male -0.118 
(0.292) 
0.819 
(0.545) 
0.206 
(0.281) 
- 0.176 
(0.344) 
Years of schooling 0.124 
(0.266) 
0.445 
(0.429) 
0.987 
(0.328)*** 
0.305 
(0.370) 
Years of schooling sq. - 0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.022 
(0.025) 
- 0.064 
(0.020)*** 
- 0.008 
(0.023) 
Age 0.122 
(0.084) 
0.220 
(0.094)** 
0.096 
(0.087) 
0.189 
(0.110)* 
Age sq. -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.001)** 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001)* 
Valley -0.402 
(0.290) 
-0.262 
(0.259) 
0.014 
(0.251) 
0.046 
(0.454) 
Poor 0.518 
(0.231)** 
- 0.404 
(0.273) 
- 0.639 
(0.273)** 
-0.390 
(0.260) 
Experience 0.053 
(0.171) 
b/ 0.573 
(0.162)*** 
-0.062 
(0.541) 
Experience sq. 0.019 
(0.015) 
b/ -0.030 
(0.015)** 
0.023 
(0.037) 
Constant -2.010 
(1.985) 
- 7.462 
(2.696) 
-7.115 
(2.342)*** 
- 5.250 
(2.599)** 
Observations a/ 157 123 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2529 0.2332 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Columns I, II and III are the results of a multivariate probit 
regression (MSL, # draws = 20). Column IV is the result of a separate (univariate) probit regression. 
* Means a 10% level of confidence; ** a 5% level of confidence; *** a 1% level of confidence 
a/ The observations exclude the first promotion (28 individuals) and those including missing values.  
b/ The variable experience was removed from the shop equation because it was insignificant (at 10% confidence 
level) and it had a strange behavior, due to strong collinearity with other variables. 
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Appendix 4: The Kamayoq School 
Cohort (year) 
Communities 
of origin 
Topic 
Training’s 
duration 
(days) 
Graduates 
Age average 
Schooling 
average Total Male Female 
First (96-97) 07 
Irrigation, native 
crops, horticulture, 
stockbreeding, 
forestation 
27 26 19 07 
36.7 
 
6.7 
Second (97-98) 11 
Idem 1st , 
agro-industry 
29 27 22 05 35.4 7.4 
Third (99-00) 13 Idem 2nd 27 42 29 13 33.1 7.9 
Fourth (02) 15 
Animal sanitation, 
stockbreeding 
27 22 21 1 34.8 
8.4 
 
Fifth (03) 15 
Animal sanitation, 
stockbreeding 
27 35 28 07 35.2 n.a. 
Sixth (04-05) 17 Alpaca farming 31 35 35 0 35.6 8.1 
Seventh (06-07) 09 
Native potatoes 
farming 
a/ 23 17 6 n.a. 6.4 
Average (1-6) 13 - 28 31 26 (86%) 5 (18%) 35.1 7.7 
Source: own elaboration from School’s records and from Figueroa and Portugal (1998). 
a/ Information not yet available at the time of writing. 
